报告题目：What is in “Moral Hazard”? Evidence from Quasi Experiments in China？
嘉宾简介：黄炜，新加坡国立大学校长特聘助理教授，美国国家经济研究局（NBER）博士后研究员。哈佛大学经济学博士学位，北京大学经济学硕士和物理学学士。他的研究领域是公共经济学，劳动经济学和卫生经济学。他的研究成果已发表在Review of Economic and Statistics, Journal of Labor Economics, American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, Nature, Journal of Economic Perspectives,管理世界等国内外期刊。2018年起，他担任Economics of Transition的联合主编。
内容提要：We explore two different natural experiments in urban China using administrative datawith more than 3 million observations to estimate the price elasticity and income elasticity ofhealthcare utilization. First, we exploit a sharp reduction in inpatient cost sharing at age 80in one city, using a regression discontinuity design (RDD) to examine its effect on utilization.The price elasticity of inpatient care usage ranges from -0.15 to -0.32. The effects are largerfor poorer populations. Second, we explore the timing of pension increases in different years,using an event study approach to estimate their impacts on healthcare usage. For the samepopulation, we find that the income elasticity of inpatient care usage ranges from 1.3-2.0,which suggests that 40-60 percent of the moral hazard is overestimated because of incomeeffect. For the poorer population, approximately 50-70 percent of the price elasticity could beexplained by income effect. Finally, the reduced cost sharing is associated with significantlylower out-of-pocket (OOP) expenditures but has little impact on mortality.