报告题目：Renegotiation After Sovereign Default: Bygones No Longer
内容提要：In the aftermath of a sovereign default, debt recovery is determined through a restructuring process. This recovery is important for both the country and the creditors. For the country, debt recovery determines its debt burden after exiting default and impacts macroeconomic performance. For the creditors, recovery reduces their losses. Using the dataset of Cruces and Trebesch (2013), I show that the level of recovery is positively related with the level of defaulted debt. In light of this finding, I build a framework that rationalizes this strong association by employing the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution in a model of sovereign debt renegotiation, while jointly matching standard emerging markets’ behavior. I identify the key assumptions that enable the model to match the data. I also show that the model using a standard Nash bargaining protocol results in debt recovery being unrelated to the outstanding level of debt.